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To address future challenges, the institutional framework of the European Union needs to be 
firmly anchored in the European public and to rely on some kind of collective sense of 
belonging. But how can this be realised when the public is multicultural and has little in 
common? Switzerland has often been considered as a potential blueprint on the basis o f three 
major points o f convergence First, both the Swiss and European experiences are cases where 
national identity cannot be based on a unique culture, but where different cultures have to be 
merged below an overarching sense of identity Second, this overarching sense has to cope 
with a continuing sense of identity with the lower level entities -  the cantons in Switzerland 
and the nation states in the European Union (EU) Third, in both cases the creation of common 
political structures has come prior to the existence of a common identity The successful 
emergence of a national identity in Switzerland thus appears to be very encouraging for a 
future European identity From this perspective, the article first highlights the reasons for the 
Swiss success story - the carefully crafted institutional mix of federalism, direct democracy and 
neutrality that has become the rallying point o f a collective identity However, the article also 
reveals the price o f this success -  the use of selected exclusionary tendencies to avoid dilution 
In particular, we show how these tendencies have developed in the policy domains of foreign 
affairs, trade and immigration The bottom line is that the Swiss case may be an example of 
successful integration but it may also be an historical exception It clearly shows that 
constitutional patriotism is feasible but it also highlights that in the case of Switzerland this was 





















































































































































































In Italy for 30 years under the Borgjas they had 
warfare, terror, murder, and bloodshed, but they 
produced Michelangelo, Leonardo da Vinci, and the 
Renaissance In Switzerland they had brotherly love 
-  they had 500 years o f democracy and peace, and 
what did that produce? The cuckoo clock.
(Harry Lime (Orson Welles) in “The Third Man," by 
Orson Welles)
1. Introduction'
The European Union (EU) is currently at a critical juncture: it not only faces the 
challenges of enlargement and an expanding agenda, but is also simultaneously 
questioning its own destiny. A number of authors claim that the European Union 
can face these challenges successfully only if it gains the support of the European 
population behind its current and future projects. Instrumental in this appears to 
be the forging of some sort of commonly shared European identity, which, ac­
cording to most scholars, is largely lacking at the present time. Although the 
problem of a lacking European identity is not new, it has raised increasing con­
cern amgng its scholars and observers Notions like “common political culture”1 23 
or “social legitimisation”,3 all reflect this quest for a more profound underpinnings 
of the process of European integration. It is necessary to ask, however, if the 
construction of this kind of overarching identity is realistic? Is it possible to es­
tablish a feeling of belonging between over 300 million citizens who speak differ­
ent languages and come from different cultural backgrounds? A significant part of 
the difficulty derives from the resilience of well-established national identities, 
based on national cultural and political heritages. Given that these anchors are not 
likely to vanish, the only way of proceeding is to superimpose a wider sense of 
belonging. Although it might be possible to find a minimal common cultural de­
nominator for all the members of the European Union, this would clearly be too 
shallow to ground the new identity firmly. Any future European society will be 
multicultural and thus its sense of common identity will have to be built upon 
non-cultural factors. The problem, of course, is how to achieve such a task.
1 We wish to thank Lars-Erik Cederman, Ernst Haas, Malik Mazbouri, Lorena Panni and Fre­
deric Vandenberghe for their valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper.
2 Habermas, Jürgen “Citizenship and National Identity.” Praxis International. 12(1) (1992): 7- 
19 (p 17).
3 Weiler, Joseph H. “After Maastricht: Community Legitimacy in Post-1992 Europe.” In Ad­




























































































To help address this challenge, decision-makers and scholars alike have started to 
look for blueprints in other similar processes of identity-building within multicul­
tural societies. Back in the mid 1960s Etzioni4, cited by Schmid,5 took Canada, 
the Union of South Africa, Switzerland, Belgium, Nigeria and India as good ex­
amples of this.6 *8In a more recent contribution Habermas’ explicitly cites the 
United States and Switzerland as multicultural societies which have achieved 
some sort of "constitutional patriotism," that is, an identification with constitu­
tional principles and not with the state as such or with common cultural origins.9 
In such cases, he argues that
... the political culture must serve as the common denominator for a constitutional 
patriotism which simultaneously sharpens an awareness of the multiplicity and in­
tegrity of the different forms o f life which coexist in a multicultural society .9
He then goes on to propose them as examples for the construction of a European 
identity.10 Is this a promising path to follow or -  on the contrary -  an illusory one? 
To answer this question, a detailed exploration needs to be made of already es­
tablished cases of constitutional patriotism. This article addresses the Swiss ex­
perience and its limited implications for the future of European identity. It does so 
by focusing on the relationship between exclusion and dilution -  the underlying 
theme of this volume.
The relevance of the Swiss experience for our understanding of identity formation 
in the EU seems indisputable. There are at least three strong parallels between the 
two cases. First, multiculturalism forms a part of this process. In Switzerland, 
four linguistic regions and two major religions lead to its being a truly multicul­
tural society. Scattered over a small territory, but geographically separated par­
tially by mountain chains, different cultural traditions have formed and continue 
to this day. Similarly, the European Union comprises a large set of different lin­
4 Etzioni, Amitai Political Unification: A Comparative Study o f Leaders and Forces. New 
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston (1965), pp. 22, 35.
5 Schmid, Carol L. Conflict and Consensus in Switzerland Berkeley: University of California 
Press (1981), p. 1.
6 Today we would perhaps disagree with Etzioni in several o f these cases, not least, the case of 
Nigeria.
1 op. cit.
8 In the case of the United States, one might argue that the common language provided (at 
least to some degree) a common cultural denominator. This should, however, not obscure the 
fact that the cultural background of the immigrants in the United States has remained very diverse.
9 Habermas, op. cit, p. 17.
10 See also Howe, Paul “A Community of Europeans: The Requisite Underpinnings.” Journal 
o f Common Market Studies. 33(1) (1995): 27-46, and Delanty, Gerard “National and European 
Citizenship: Democracy, Culture and Identity in a Postnational Europe”. In Lars-Erik Cederman 




























































































guistic traditions, religious faiths and cultural backgrounds. Second, the hallmark 
of citizenship seems to be “harmony in diversity”. Up to 1848, Switzerland con­
sisted -  with a short interruption during the Helvetic Republic -  of a series of 
autonomous states (cantons), united in a Confederation. Even after the foundation 
of the federal state, individuals continued to become citizens of Switzerland in an 
indirect way. Every Swiss person is recognised as being a citizen of a commune, 
which automatically confers on her citizenship of the respective canton, and, as a 
result of this, national citizenship. This process of becoming a citizen is similar to 
that created by the Maastricht treaty. Article 8 of this treaty establishes the 
"citizenship of the Union" and stipulates that ”[e]very person holding the nation­
ality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union." Third, one of the driving 
forces in the construction of the Swiss federal state was that of economic integra­
tion. Abolishing duties at the borders between cantons, setting up a common cur­
rency and other economic measures were at the centre in the building of the fed­
eral state. The parallel with the European Union is only too evident. Despite its 
undeniable underlying political aims, European integration proceeded by first 
forging economic co-ordination and integration.
Given these parallels, the emergence of a Swiss national identity in the second 
half of the last century, and its persistence since then, seems to be very encourag­
ing for a future European identity. From this perspective, we will carefully ana­
lyse the key institutional elements that lay behind the process of identity forma­
tion in section 2 -  the mix of federalism, direct democracy and neutrality. Success 
came at a price, however. The considerable achievement of overcoming cultural 
differences and in forming a national identity went together with exclusionary 
tendencies with respect to the outside world. We discuss these tendencies in sec­
tion 3, and attempt to determine whether they are inevitably linked to a national 
identity in a multicultural society. In section 4, we show that the delicate balance 
between identity and exclusion is not easy to maintain under “constitutional pa­
triotism”. Since identity is so closely linked to the functioning of the institutions, 
perturbations in the latter can easily undermine the former. As a result, these 
perturbations can create tensions and manifest themselves in identity crises. The 
balance proves to be increasingly sensitive in a changing international environ­
ment, where outside pressure and influences are all the more pervasive.
How useful then is the Swiss experience for a future European identity? Should it 
be used as an example, as some argue? Whereas we do not dispute that Swiss 
national identity is a clear example of successful constitutional patriotism, we 
show that it offers a very specific blueprint for identity formation -  one marked 
by selected exclusionary tendencies towards the external world. The inclusion of 
different cultures inside the same polity has required a very cautious external 




























































































exclusion might have derived from historical and geographical contingencies, the 
Swiss case tends to reveal that the formation of collective identity inside multicul­
tural societies is a delicate act of balancing between inclusion and exclusion. 
Given this cautious and prudent assessment we carefully derive some tentative 
implications for a future European identity.
2. Identity formation in Switzerland
As in other countries, the emergence of a national identity in Switzerland is 
strongly linked to the creation of the nation-state in the 19th century. Up to the 
end of the 18th century Switzerland consisted of a loose Confederation of can­
tons. It was only during the military occupation by France and the establishment 
of the “Helvetic Republic” (1798-1802), followed by Napoleon's protectorate 
(1802-1813), that a unified state emerged. The new state did not survive the end 
of the protectorate, and the country reverted to a Confederation of cantons, al­
though larger and more diverse than the previous one. The entity comprised 
Catholic and Protestant cantons, with populations speaking French, German, 
Italian and Romantsch. Their common decision-making instrument was the 
“Diete”, which brought together the representatives of the cantons once a year 
The main concerns of this body were to co-ordinate “foreign policy”, which was 
still the responsibility of the cantons, and economic integration. In the latter do­
main, the reduction of duties levelled at the cantons' frontiers and other measures 
proved to be important steps towards the establishment of a common market. The 
completion of a unified economic market (suppression of trade barriers, introduc­
tion of a single currency, etc.) was as one of the prime achievements of the new 
federal state.
The loosely structured decision-making procedures of the Confederation only al­
lowed sparingly for the emergence of a national identity. Nevertheless, signs of a 
common and persevering sense of belonging began to appear. Andrey" notes that 
three elements contributed strongly to this process. First, the Swiss Confederation 
remained vulnerable to foreign involvement in its internal affairs. In particular, 
foreign powers exerted strong pressure on the asylum policy, forcing the cantons 
to adopt a more restrictive policy. They argued that immigrants to Switzerland 
were engaged in subversive activities that threatened the security of these foreign 
powers. In addition, some foreign powers also forced some cantons to restrict the 
freedom of press to prevent the spread of political subversion. According to An-
" Andrey, Georges “Auf der Suche nach dem neuen Staat (1798-1848).” In Comité pour une 
nouvelle histoire de la Suisse (ed.) Geschichte der Schweiz und der Schweizer. Lausanne: 




























































































drey12, these various types of intervention against the cantons' sovereignty stimu­
lated the affirmation of a national identity. In fact, the resistance against foreign 
oppressors does not date back to that particular period, but is a recurrent and 
central characteristic of Swiss history. Accordingly, it has had a strong impact on 
the characteristics of Swiss identity. The elite used the myth of the 1291 Confed­
eral Pact between the three alpine cantons and the long fight for independence of 
the old Confederation to stimulate patriotism and national consciousness.13 145Focus­
ing the Swiss inhabitants on a common enemy proved to be a successful strategy 
in raising a common sense of identity.
Second, a series of military, cultural, religious, scientific and historical associa­
tions were formed at the federal level in the 1820s and 1830s.'4 Formed of mem­
bers of all cantons, irrespective of language or religion, they favoured exchanges 
and various forms of collaboration across cantons and cultures. According to Au­
drey,1' they played a significant role in the emergent feeling of belonging to some 
new entity. Together with the liberal ideas of the time, they increasingly showed 
the need for more centralised institutions The process of setting up these institu­
tions and their specific design formed the third key element in the nascent na­
tional identity.
The questions regarding types of institutional structure and the distribution of 
powers between the federal level and the cantons were very controversial issues 
in the 1830s and 1840s; they proved to be enough controversial to cause a short 
civil war in 1847 (the so-called "Sonderbund" war), which opposed radical Prot­
estant cantons against conservative Catholic cantons. The former believed that 
Switzerland needed a political system with a common government that could im­
pose identical policies on all cantons. Accordingly, they favoured national cen­
tralisation or, at least, a federal government strong enough to further common in­
terests. The conservative Catholic cantons, by contrast, were hostile to centrali­
sation and created an alliance, the “Sonderbund”, to oppose the creation of a 
central state. The radicals won the war but did not exclude the losers from the 
subsequent process of state-building. Thus, the creation of the Swiss federation
12 ibid.
13 In this Pact the three founding cantons committed themselves to a defensive alliance against 
foreign oppressors. Interestingly, the existence of the 1291 Confederal Pact was ignored until 
the late 19th century. This Pact was first mentioned in 1887 by Johannes Dierauer in his book 
on the "History of the Swiss Confederation". Moreover, the national holiday celebrating the 
1291 Pact (1st August) was introduced by the Federal Council in only 1891.
14 It is worth noting that despite the early market integration, federal economic associations 





























































































reflected an institutional compromise: the radicals conceded to the Catholics a 
system that provided the cantons with a considerable level of autonomy.
More generally, the federal structure allowed for the combination of two antago­
nistic principles, namely, unity and diversity. This feature has often been consid­
ered as the most typical element of the Swiss political system and political cul­
ture.16 Through the principle of subsidiarity, federalism left sufficient policy areas 
under the control of the cantonal authorities. In addition, any change in the distri­
bution of competencies between the federal state and the cantons is subject to a 
dual ratification procedure. The introduction of any new jurisdiction at the federal 
level requires a constitutional amendment, which has to be approved by the dou­
ble majority of people and cantons. The double majority principle ensured the 
Catholic cantons some degree of control over the size of the federal state. To­
gether, the two factors explain why even the losers of the civil war could identify 
with the newly created institutions. The latter enabled the Catholic cantons to 
pursue a separate development without too many constraints being imposed on 
them from the federal level. On the other hand, the more progressive cantons 
were free to experiment with their more progressive ideas. The federalist struc­
ture thus defused the potential for conflict between cultural subgroups. Since this 
institutional arrangement allowed sufficient leeway for the different cultural enti­
ties to manage their internal affairs, it became a positive factor of integration and 
identify formation. Hence, while allowing different developments at the lower 
levels, it fostered at the same time a common sense of belonging.
The second main institution introduced in the 1848 constitution, that of direct 
democracy, also has old historical roots, starting from the direct democratic or 
collective "self-government" of the local communities prevalent in the middle age. 
In the 19,h century, many cantons had already introduced semi-direct democracy 
devices into their jurisdictions (popular initiatives and referendums which typi­
cally applied to amendments to the constitution) while others still relied on a 'true' 
direct democracy (i.e. on popular assemblies or "Landsgemeinden"). The devel­
opment of direct democratic practices at the federal level occurred in three steps 
during the early years of the federal state. The mandatory referendum for consti­
16 e g. Bergier, Jean-François Europe et les Suisses. Impertinences d'un historien. Carouge- 
Genève: Editions Zoé (1992), p.160; Deutsch, Karl W. Die Schweiz als ein paradigmatischer 
Fall politischer Integration Bern: Haupt (1976); Linder, Wolf Swiss Democracy. Possible 
Solutions to Conflict in Multicultural Societies. London: MacMillan (1994). While being a 
characteristic element o f the Swiss institutional set-up, one should not forget that federalism 
was a direct import from the USA (Linder, ibid). When setting up the constitution in 1847/8, 
the founding fathers o f the Confederation drew inspiration from the American Constitution, 




























































































tutional changes was introduced immediately in the first constitution in 1848,” 
while the optional referendum was added in 1874,* 18 and the popular initiative in 
1891.19
The instruments of direct democracy contributed to internal political stability and 
consequently fostered a stronger national identity. First, by offering to citizens the 
means by which to intervene directly in public affairs, they strengthened identifi­
cation with decisions made at the national level. Second, the instruments of direct 
democracy strongly influenced the executive and the legislative. In the early years 
of the federal state, they forced a monolithic government -  formed exclusively of 
radicals -  to respect the wishes of minority groups. Optional referendums, skil­
fully used by the Catholics, kept the government at bay. Their obstruction tactics 
proved successful as the catholic opposition was ultimately bought off by the 
radical majority and given a seat in the government The opening of the executive 
sphere, coupled with the requirements of a collegial executive,20 resulted in 
greater consensual policy making. The threat of the optional referendum also 
forced the government and the elite in the parliament to cooperate more closely 
and to search for compromises well before the final stages of the legislation pro­
cedure.21 Finally, by favouring the emergence of the citizens in the role of a po­
tential opposition, the instruments of direct democracy increased the attention 
paid by the elites to the different subcultures in Swiss society.
Although neutrality was not given a prominent place in the federal constitution,22 
it nevertheless played a crucial role in setting up the institutions and in the suc­
cessful formation of a national identity. The defeat of Swiss troops in Marignan 
1515 put an end to military involvement abroad, and opened the era of neutrality 
a foreign policy instrument with both internal and external functions. Internally, 
it was a factor of balance and peace between the different subcultures and can­
tons. Externally, the Congress of Vienna in 1815 recognised its role for peace and
11 In this case, any group may call for a final decision by the electorate on a bill adopted by 
parliament. In order for this to take place, the group has only to collect a certain number of 
signatures from citizens.
18 The mandatory referendum automatically takes place without popular impulsion. It applies, 
for instance, to any amendment to or revision o f the Constitution
19 By collecting a certain number of signatures, a group can place an issue on the political 
agenda and force the elite -  and then the electorate -  to vote on a constitutional amendment, 
whatever the subject
20 Fleiner-Gerster, Thomas “Le Conseil fédéral: Directoire de la Confédération.” Pouvoirs 43 
(1) (1987): 49-63.
21 Neidhart, Leonard Plebiszit und pluralitare Demokratie, Eine Analyse der Funktionen des 
schweizerischen Gesetzesreferendum Bern: Francke (1970).




























































































stability in Europe.23 At a time when militarised nation-states dominated Europe, 
this reliance on neutrality helped to create a perception of a special destiny and 
thus strengthened the identification of individuals with the nation. Facing expan­
sionist-minded neighbours, the Swiss elite felt a strong need for internal strength 
in conjunction with the pursuit of neutrality in external affairs. In particular, the 
elite favoured the development of a strong centre that would be useful not only 
with regard to the military dimension but would also give more power for manag­
ing economic relationships with the external world.24
Neutrality was especially useful in crisis situations. During the First World War 
significant tensions appeared among the different linguistic regions, but these 
were reduced through the pursuit of a strict neutrality .25 In the Second World War 
the role it played as an integrative factor was even more important. At the same 
time, as on previous occasions, the country’s neutrality allowed also for economic 
advantages by providing safe havens and a stable environment. This applied to 
war situations -  trade was possible with both sides -  and to situations of world 
economic sanctions against specific states (e g. South Africa) In other words, 
neutrality provided Swiss businesses with a convenient excuse for picking up lu­
crative business opportunities abandoned by foreign competitors due to economic 
sanctions.
In the absence of a common culture, the three institutional cornerstones have 
made up an integrative framework which has allowed for the successful emer­
gence of a national identity. The influence of political institutions has not only 
played a central role in this process, but has helped to keep it stable ever since. 
The elite has always underlined the specificity of the Swiss federal democratic 
state, bom out of a political will and in opposition to foreign powers, which has 
created the myth of Switzerland as a “nation of will” (“Willensnation”).26
23 Earlier on, the Wesphalia Treaty in 1648 had recognised the Confederates’ sovereignty and 
declared its independence from the Empire. The Congress o f Vienna officially rooted a na­
tionally chosen principle in international law.
24 Bergier, op. cit., p.120.
25 That one of the Federal Councillors was forced to step down for an obvious breach of neu­
trality illustrates that this institution kept its integrative force even during these difficult times 
(Jost, Hans Ulrich “Bedrohung und Enge (1914-1945).” In Comité pour une nouvelle histoire 
de la Suisse (ed.) Geschichle der Schweiz und der Schweizer. Lausanne Payot (1986), pp. 
731-820).
26 According to the historian Messmer, this interpretation guaranteed the continuity of the po­
litical-historical nationality: Switzerland was a "Willensnation", a constitutional state, built over 
a century long period on federalist and democratic principles; a free Alpine republic that man­
aged to protect its independence thanks to a commitment to neutrality (Messmer, Beatrix, 





























































































Neutrality, federalism and direct democracy provided the ingredients for a 
peaceful, economically successful and politically stable development of Swiss 
society. This success significantly enhanced the identification of the Swiss popu­
lation with the institutional mix of its federal state. In this slow process, taking 
around a hundred years from the foundation of the Swiss state, it was the Swiss 
institutions that became the rallying point of the national identity. The emergence 
of this identity was, however, partly premised on the existence on an ongoing list 
of common enemies, as we showed above, starting with the Habsburg empire, 
continuing with Napoleon and perhaps coming to an end with the fall of the So­
viet empire. This dependence on common enemies points to an identity which is 
defensive in nature as one scholar has recently commented:
"Consequently I propose to consider [the Swiss national identity] as an identity 
that finds its form mostly in a process of demarcation and in profound experiences 
of defence in common against superior enemies"21
How has this defensive behaviour materialised? Has it simply remained present in 
the minds of the Swiss citizens from the early glorious days of military battles 
against external powers? Or did it come into existence through the various exclu­
sionary tendencies in different policy domains? In this section we seek to answer 
this question and focus on three policy domains: foreign involvement, trade, and 
immigration policy. These three areas are key interfaces between any sovereign 
entity and its external environment, and as a consequence should be natural do­
mains for the exercise, if there is any, of exclusionary practices.
A. Foreign involvement
The prime example for such exclusions appears to stem from the hesitant in­
volvement of Switzerland in affairs beyond its borders. Constitutional referen­
dums held in Switzerland have recently attracted attention abroad for their sur­
prising outcomes on several foreign affairs issues. In particular, the rejection by 
the Swiss people of the treaty on the European Economic Area (EEA) between 
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and European Community (EC) 
countries has largely contributed to depicting Switzerland as an isolated island in 
a European-wide movement towards economic and political unity. If one adds the





























































































fact that Switzerland is one of the few countries which is not a member of the 
United Nations, the overall impression is that it has been extremely exclusionary 
in terms of its foreign involvement. The commonly accepted argument states that 
these exclusionary tendencies can be explained by the mythical notion of neutral­
ity, which is one of the cornerstones of Swiss identity. From this perspective, it is 
better to be Europe's odd-man-out and the world's archetype of a political fearful 
foreign actor than to possibly endanger national identity.
There is indeed some truth in such a vision. It does summarise in just a few words 
the exclusionary tendencies that are associated with the Swiss identity. It is, how­
ever, too simplistic and does not give credit to the less publicly well-known side 
of Swiss foreign involvement, which started with its participation in the Latin 
Monetary Union in the nineteenth century, continued with its entry into the 
League of Nations after the First World War, proceeded after this with efforts 
towards the European economic reconstruction after the Second World War, and 
which can now be seen in its current membership in almost all the international 
economic institutions. The question thus moves to focus on the degree to which 
Swiss foreign involvement has been exclusionary, and to what extent this can be 
linked to the specific institutions of the country. To address this question, we will 
consider briefly some developments in the nineteenth century, before moving to 
the participation of Switzerland in the League of Nations. This description will 
show us that Switzerland was active on the international scene, participating in 
numerous international agreements. We will then analyse its foreign involvement 
since 1945 and examine the regional and global dimensions of this. This will in­
stead suggest a picture of a much more cautious actor in the international arena.
Before 1848, when the new Constitution gave power to the federal state in this 
domain, there was virtually no Swiss foreign policy. From this date on, Switzer­
land’s behaviour has been driven by some key concerns. First and foremost, for­
eign involvement has been guided by the overarching goals of preserving and 
strengthening national sovereignty. This implies a quest for political independ­
ence. Second, foreign involvement has traditionally been marked by a willingness 
to promote the economic development of the country. Third, involvement has 
gradually been widened from issues involving neighbouring territories to world 
wide concerns, aiming at the largest possible opening on the world. How have 
these aims been implemented? The main instrument has been the concept of neu­
trality, which has helped to take advantage of the prevalent international envi­
ronment while managing to avoid upsetting the country’s delicate internal cultural 
balance. Economic involvement and political restraint already characterised the 
first 50 years of Swiss foreign policy. Starting in the 1850s, Switzerland carefully 
refrained from participating in the unification movements occurring at its borders 




























































































ment in both trade and monetary matters were quite important during that period, 
maybe more important than they ever were afterwards (at least regarding the 
monetary domain).2*
The outbreak of the First World War signalled the onset of a difficult era for 
Swiss sovereignty and its internal stability. The invasion of neutral Belgium by 
German troops showed the Swiss on how precarious their position at the heart of 
a continent at war was. The most damaging consequence was the suspension of 
normal trade flows, leading to a situation where the external trade of Switzerland 
slipped largely out of the hands of the Federal Council and into those of the Swiss 
Society for Economic surveillance, which was closely monitored by the Allies. 
This surveillance, coupled with the atrocities of the war, strengthened the hand of 
pacifist movements inside the country. In addition, the different linguistic com­
munities felt divergent attractions towards the warring factions. The Swiss- 
Germans had more sympathy for the cause of the German Empire, while the 
Swiss-French tended to support the Allies. Neutrality could only partly prevent 
these internal conflicts and unity clearly came under stress.
At the end of the war, the government attempted to increase its political involve­
ment in world affairs, including participation in the emerging idea of a future 
League of Nations. However, given that there was no public willingness to aban­
don neutrality, the government had the difficult task of achieving more under the 
same domestic constraints. In practice, this consisted of becoming a member of 
the League of Nations while preserving neutrality, and it proved hard to convince 
the Allies of its viability, even though the Swiss had several personal friendships 
among the Allies' top decision-makers.28 9 The result was, however, the recognition
28 With respect to economic issues, in 1864 Switzerland joined the Cobden-Chevallier bilateral 
network of trade liberalisation and the Latin Monetary Union in 1865 (on the network of trade, 
see for instance Bairoch, Paul “European Trade Policy, 1815-1914 ” In The Cambridge Eco­
nomic History o f  Europe, Cambridge Cambridge University Press (1989) and Condliffe, John 
B The Commerce o f  Nations. New York W.W Norton (1950); for short accounts o f the 
Latin Monetary Union, see Yeager, Leland B International Monetary Relations New York: 
Harper and Row (1966) In reference to technical issues, Switzerland became a member of the 
Telegraph Union in 1869, o f the Word Postal Union in 1874, the Office of Patents in 1883, the 
Union for Intellectual Property Rights in 1886 and the Railroad Union in 1890
29 Rappard, William L'entrée de la Suisse dans la Société des Nations. Genève: Sonor (1924); 
Ruffieux, Roland “L'entrée de la Suisse dans la Société des Nations (1918-1920).” In Ruffieux, 
Roland (ed.) la  démocratie référendaire en Suisse au XXème siècle, Fribourg: Ed. de l'Uni­
versité (1972), pp 39-118, Dupont, Cédric “Succès avec la SDN, échec avec l'EEE? Résis­
tances internes et négociation internationale ” Annuaire Suisse de Science Politique 32 (1992): 
249-272; Dupont, Cédric “Domestic Politics and International Negotiations: A Sequential 
Bargaining Model ” In Allan, Pierre and Christian Schmidt (eds.) Game Iheory and Interna­




























































































of a permanent Swiss military neutrality. Participation in economic sanctions was, 
however, not exempted, and constituted a major break with the previous concep­
tion of full political independence. In the context of the Versailles settlement, this 
change in the neutrality status caused deep domestic resentment in the German- 
speaking part of the country. Swiss-Germans largely felt that the economic con­
ditions imposed by the Allies on Germany were unfair and they resented partici­
pation in a system that would enforce them. Attitudes were different in the 
French-speaking part, both because there was no sympathy for Germany and be­
cause there was a wider agreement over dealing with world affairs norms and 
ideals. The ratification campaign reflected this deep cultural cleavage and strained 
internal integration and stability to a dangerous extent.50 The government man­
aged the situation skilfully by playing upon the economic implications of joining 
the League to convince the reluctant Swiss Germans of the benefits of doing so. It 
argued that some restrictions on neutrality were necessary to secure the prosper­
ity of the country and its long term independence. Despite the ultimate success of 
the government in pushing the country into the League of Nations, the episode 
highlighted the limits of political activism at the external level. Subsequent behav­
iour inside the League was therefore guided by as much restraint as possible. 
Mostly, the idea was to participate while avoiding any political commitment. 
When this became impossible after the sanctions against Italy, Switzerland chose 
to leave the organisation.
After the episode of the League, the pendulum of Swiss foreign involvement re­
verted back to extreme restraint and a strict and comprehensive neutrality. Obvi­
ously, such an attitude was motivated by the unravelling of peace through Europe 
and the urgent necessity to avoid being swallowed by the subsequent wave of 
violence and horror. The consequence of this was a conception of neutrality re­
volving around the notion of the "réduit,” that is, of retreat into the alpine regions 
in the case of war. Strict neutrality was the cornerstone of Swiss domestic stabil­
ity and external "survival" during the Second World War. It is unclear what this 
meant in practice except for the fact that it probably wiped out much of the ethi­
cal capital that the country had gained over the past decades. The Swiss were 
willing to pay a very high price to preserve their unity and well-being. From this 
perspective, neutrality swung from strongly exclusionary behaviour, e g. the pol­
icy toward Jewish refugees (see below), to the continuation of business as usual 
to defuse outside pressure and keep internal divisions at bay. 30
30 The vote for the League of Nation was exceptionally close, especially with respect to the 
vote o f the cantons (56.3% o f the citizens and 111/2 out of 23 cantons accepted joining the 





























































































This strict conception of neutrality did not change after the war Contrary to its 
behaviour after the First World War, Switzerland refrained from any active for­
eign involvement in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. The main 
reason for this was that this neutrality, coupled with a strong military defence, 
was perceived to have saved the country from involvement in the conflict. 
Moreover, in contrast to the situation that prevailed during the First World War, 
neutrality helped to maintain Swiss internal unity successfully. In other words, 
there was no reason to replace this winning policy. Accordingly, Switzerland did 
not take an active part in the political institutional set-up that took place in San 
Francisco. Neither did it join the economic institutions designed in Bretton- 
Woods, because participation in the International Monetary Funds (IMF) and the 
World Bank was also perceived as a potential erosion of sovereignty.31 32The first 
sign of more activism appeared in the wake of the Marshall Plan and the creation 
in 1948 of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC). After 
much hesitation, Switzerland accepted this organisation’s invitation to join it, 
mostly because its independence was guaranteed by specific provisions.” Relying 
on this safety net, Swiss authorities played an active role in establishing the eco­
nomic agenda of the OEEC.
A basic divergence on how to address the issue of tariffs with third countries ul­
timately led to the split into two camps within the OEEC. The Six of the Euro­
pean Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) argued in favour of exploiting Article 24 
of the GATT to build a European market on the basis of regional discrimination. 
The others, including Switzerland, generally preferred to stick to non­
discrimination vis-à-vis external actors. As a consequence, the Six of the ECSC 
took the lead and decided in Messine in June 1955 to build a common market, 
free of any restriction on trade. Any Swiss participation in the emerging European 
Communities was out of question, given the political commitment that this would 
have implied.33 However, Switzerland feared the economic implications of the 
new grouping, which included its two historically major trading partners, France
31 As Lautenberg argues, this had to do with the specific situation of the Swiss franc. It quali­
fied as a rare currency and such a currency could, according to the terms of the IMF, lead to 
restrictive practices by member states (Lautenberg, Alexis. “La Suisse et les institutions de 
Bretton Woods '* In Riklin, Alois et al (eds.) Neues Handbuch der schweizerischen Aussen- 
politik Bern: Haupt (1992), pp. 863-875).
32 Article 14 o f the Organisation was often referred to as the Swiss clause. According to this 
article, decisions would be binding only to members that accept them without endangering the 
functioning of the whole organisation The Swiss authorities could therefore enjoy an opting- 
out privilege. On the Swiss entry into the OEEC, see Bauer, Gérard F. “L’adhesion de la Suisse 
a l’Organisation européenne de coopération économique: ses conditions principales ” Relations 
internationales 30 (1982): 209-219.
33 This mostly amounted to the fear that such an endeavour would put limitations on neutrality, 




























































































and Germany. To help prevent discrimination, the Federal Council became an ac­
tive supporter of British attempts to create a wide free-trade area zone between 
all the members of the OEEC.34 When the talks finally collapsed in November 
1958, Switzerland proposed a second-best alternative, that is, the idea of a more 
limited free-trade area between selected non EC-members. Endorsed by the Brit­
ish, the idea resulted in the creation of EFT A in January 1960.
The episode of the OEEC can be seen as the archetype of Swiss foreign involve­
ment at both the regional and global levels until the end of the Cold war. It fea­
tures a kind of a la carte participation in economic institutions and strict avoid­
ance of any participation in politically constraining organisations which might en­
danger its own fundamental institutions. When a la carte participation was not an 
option, the Swiss would try bilateral solutions repeatedly before turning to multi­
lateral avenues. Its entry into the GATT in the mid-sixties and its policy regarding 
European economic and political integration both reflect this attitude. Although 
GATT was created in 1947 as a temporary replacement for the failed Interna­
tional Trade Organisation (ITO), Switzerland did not join it until it received a 
formal guarantee that its farm policy would be left untouched.35 The way was then 
safe for participation, given both the fact that the scope was limited to merchan­
dise trade and that the GATT charter provided many loopholes and safeguard 
mechanisms that could be used where there might be some danger for its national 
sovereignty. On matters of European integration, the driving axiom was that of 
remaining economically as close as possible, while falling short of any actual 
political commitment. The route toward this goal was both bilateral -  association 
attempts in 1962-63 -  and multilateral inside the EFTA. Switzerland actively 
played the EFTA card in the 1960s, leading to the removal of all tariffs on indus­
trial goods. Playing the EFTA card also meant making continuous efforts to keep 
close economic links with EC countries. Both the multilateral and bilateral op­
tions converged in the signing of the free trade agreement in 1972 on industrial 
goods, and continued to influence the course of Swiss European policy through­
out the 1970s and early 1980s.
A cautious and functional foreign involvement in external affairs enjoyed very 
high domestic political support not least because it did not endanger the main in­
34 Enz, Annette “Die Schweiz und die Grosse Europâische Freihandelszone.” Studien und 
Quellen, Zeitschrift des Schweizerischen Bundesarchivs 16/17 (1991): 157-261, Humi, Bet­
tina “The Failure to Establish the Large Free Trade Area.” In Du Bois, Pierre and Bettina 
Fiumi (eds.) EFTA From Yesterday to Tomorrow. Geneva: EFTA (1987), pp. 27-35.
35 Jacobi, Klaus “Die Schweiz als Mitglied intemationaler Wirtschaftsorganisationen (GATT 
und OECD).” In Riklin, Alois et al. (ed.) Handbuch der Schweizerischen Aussenpolitik Bern: 
Haupt (1975), pp 761-781, Aebi, Peter “Das GATT und die Schweiz.” Schweizer Monat- 




























































































stitutions, and also because it simultaneously helped increase national welfare. 
Entry into the GATT was not put to the popular ballot and the free-trade agree­
ment with EC was endorsed enthusiastically (approval by 72.5 % of the voters). 
On the contrary, the Swiss people massively rejected in 1986 the government's 
only attempt to join the United Nations (rejection by 73.5 % of the voters). There 
was thus no reason in the mid-eighties to change course on its policy of foreign 
involvement.
To sum-up, the Swiss attitude on foreign involvement has been significantly 
marked since 1945 by political restraint and economic opportunism, or, in other 
words, by selected exclusionary practices. This has proved to be an effective way 
of strengthening the political stability and enhancing economic prosperity for 
most of this period. Neutrality without question has played a central role in 
achieving this goal of Swiss foreign policy. In addition, the Swiss political elites 
have repeatedly emphasised the considerable achievement of the policy of neu­
trality, even when its real contribution has not been so obvious" or glorious in 
terms of international solidarity.36 7 In other words, they have constantly over­
emphasised the achievement of neutrality and minimised its drawbacks. As a re­
sult, an attachment to and identification with neutrality has grown sharply among 
citizens.
B. Trade
The Swiss economy is commonly perceived as a liberal non-interventionist ffee- 
market system. The term liberal mainly applies to three areas.3" First, Switzerland 
is a model of “liberal evolution”,39 which implies a low profile economic policy 
on the part of the government In accordance with the subsidiarity principle, state 
intervention was called for only in cases of emergency, i.e. when civil society
36 For instance, several historical studies have cast doubt on the real achievement of neutrality 
during the Second World War. More especially, the fact that Hitler’s troops did not invade the 
Swiss territory might have had nothing to do with Swiss neutrality, but be due to other rea­
sons, such as the role played by Switzerland as a financial centre, or even to historical coinci­
dence.
37 Sometimes, the Swiss authorities have even exaggerated the actual extent o f neutrality itself 
Thus, in most international crises of the 20th century, a policy of full economic neutrality (i.e 
no participation in economic sanctions) has in fact been impossible to implement (Gabriel, Jurg 
Martin Schweizer Neutrality im Wandel. Hin zur EG. Frauenfeld: Huber (1990)): Switzerland 
has had to comply with pressures exerted by one of the warring factions or by the international 
system.
38 Rentsch, Hans Cartels and Wealth: A Paradox in the Swiss Economic System Zug: For- 
schungsinstitut fur Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik (1989).




























































































could not solve the problems itself. Second, the Swiss economy is liberal in its 
low tariffs for industrial goods. As a small economy, with no raw materials, Swit­
zerland has had no choice but to support free trade in international negotiations 
like the GATT40 Foreign economic relations have been the main source of the 
country’s prosperity and the Swiss economy is still of one of the most open with 
respect to many criteria.41 Third, Switzerland, due to the absence of regulation of 
capital movements, is an important financial centre and one third of the earnings 
of Swiss banks is due to activities or services abroad. Therefore, it is not surpris­
ing that Katzenstein42 characterised Switzerland as the paradigmatic case of 'lib­
eral corporatist' pattern of adaptation to international economic changes.43 
Katzenstein44 points out, however, that two different economic sectors have de­
veloped in Switzerland: one externally-oriented and competitive, the other inter­
nally-oriented and protected While the degree of economic openness is, overall, 
considerable in Switzerland, the internationalisation of the economy has focused 
on only some branches of industry and services. Other sectors, in contrast, are 
mainly oriented toward the domestic economy, with high degrees of sheltering 
against international market forces.45
40 Exports of goods and services make up half the national product (one third only for the export of 
products -  machinery, electronics, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, textiles, watches) The Swiss open­
ness with respect to the trade of goods is, however, not exceptional among the small European 
states.
41 In 1990, Switzerland was the fifth largest exporter of services in the world. Moreover, it has 
been a leading country in foreign direct investments since the beginning of the 20u’ century 
(Bairoch, Paul “La Suisse dans le contexte international aux XIXe et XXe siècles.” In Bairoch, 
Paul et M. Kôrner (ed.) La Suisse dans l'économie mondiale. Genève: Droz (1990), pp 103- 
140).
42 Katzenstein, Peter J. Corporatism and Change: Austria, Switzerland, and the Politics o f  In­
dustry Ithaca: Cornell University Press (1984), Katzenstein, Peter J Small States in World 
Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe. Ithaca: Cornell University Press (1985)
43 Interestingly enough, Katzenstein (op. cit.) identifies economic vulnerability as a central de­
terminant of Swiss consensus politics. His argument can be summarised as follows Because of 
its size, Switzerland -  and the other small European states -  is dependent on world markets 
and is accordingly more open to the international economy than larger states; while protection­
ism is not an option, its small size increases its vulnerability to exogenous changes In this 
context, internal conflicts are a luxury that it cannot afford. Rather, openness and vulnerability 
favour national consensus through corporatist arrangements In turn, the permanent co­
operation between public and private actors allows for a flexible adaptation to international 
changes. A discussion of both Katzenstein's theoretical framework and its application to the 
Swiss case can be found in Sciarini, Pascal La Suisse face à la Communauté européenne et au 
GATT. Le cas-test de la politique agricole. Genève: Georg (1994).
44 1984, op. cit., p. 91 and 1985, op. cit., p 84
45 While the existence of a dual economy is an empirical evidence, there are still many overlaps 
between the two sectors o f the economy While talking of a 'division' o f the economy is admit­




























































































The most conspicuous example of this is agriculture, which is broadly supported 
and protected by numerous state measures.16 The history of Swiss agricultural 
policy has been strongly linked to and influenced by the policy of neutrality. In 
the strict conception of neutrality that has prevailed in Switzerland since the late 
1930s, a neutral state should prepare for possible wars or import crises by secur­
ing a high degree of food self-sufficiency. Accordingly, farm production should 
be stimulated (i.e. subsidised) and sheltered from international competition in 
time of peace The preference for a traditional agriculture consisting of small­
sized and family-based enterprises constituted a second powerful justification for 
protection and state intervention.
Counter to the overall principle of freedom of trade and industry, the state was 
explicitly allowed to support agriculture. As a result of this, a series of legal pro­
visions were introduced to support every kind of farm product. In addition, Swiss 
farmers also benefited from a sophisticated system of import controls that func­
tion very much like a protective dike. Without it, the domestic support regime 
would have been ineffective, and cheaper foreign products would have overflown 
onto the local market. While Switzerland was obviously not the only country 
sheltering its agriculture from international competition, the level of protection 
was very high compared to international standards. In the late 1980s, OECD 
studies showed that Swiss agriculture was the most heavily subsidised in the 
world. According to the OECD's PSE (production subsidy equivalent) measure, 
four fifths of Swiss farm production relied on state support, with a total cost of 7 
billion Swiss francs per year.1’ The Swiss farm policy appeared as a special case 
even when compared to the highly subsidised and protectionist European agricul­
ture under the CAP (Common Agricultural Policy). As a result, the prices of 
Swiss farm products were usually twice the price of those in EC countries.
Behaviour towards the outside reflected this willingness to insulate agriculture 
from world trade. While the Swiss authorities were strong advocates of free trade 
in most industrial products, they took constant care that agriculture would be ex­
empted from any international agreement, be it at the European or international 
level. As discussed above, Switzerland gained special treatment for its agriculture 
when joining the GATT in 1966, and farm products were consistently left out of 
any regional agreement within EFT A or with the EC.
Direct democracy contributed largely to maintain these exclusionary practices. 
Thanks to having an almost complete power of veto, the farm lobby contributed *47
16 Sciarini, 1994, op cit.





























































































to the inertia of the political system in the agricultural area, i.e. to its very limited 
ability to reform.® More precisely, the Swiss agricultural policy is an example 
where the indirect effects of the institutions of direct democracy are clearly visi­
ble: supporting Neidhart's48 9 hypothesis, this policy arena saw the development of 
concertation in the pre-parliamentary phase, the inclusion of all actors who might 
threaten to call for a referendum in the decision-making process, the elaboration 
of partial compromises and a parliament reduced to the role of a "rubber stamp",50 
at least until the mid-1980s.5' One should add that there was a broad consensus, 
also among Swiss citizens, that agriculture should be supported, mostly because 
of the non-economic functions that it performed. In turn, the attachment to the ru­
ral way of life, traditions and cultures became a significant part of the Swiss 
identity. Peasants saw themselves as the “heart of society”.52 This vision found its 
most visible expression in the years of the Second World War. While the army 
defended Swiss independence at the frontier, the peasants waged a “plantation 
war”53 inside the country. Such powerful analogies explain to a large extent the 
persistence of a mythic image of the peasant:
The mythic image of the peasant is strongly influenced by the romantic and idealis­
tic tales of the last centuries. . . . Even though one looks at these pathetic images, 
which make the peasant an incarnation of freedom, of direct democracy and of an 
intact nature, in a much more critical way nowadays, these mythic images persist at 
a more or less conscious level.54
Exclusionary practices also applied to other sectors. Regulation either by the state 
or by private contractual arrangements (cartels, price maintenance and monopo­
lies) to eliminate competition was also the rule in various areas of the secondary 
and tertiary domestic sectors,55 even though the situation has evolved to some 
extent over the last few years. Switzerland thus represents a case of'selective lib­
48 Swiss agriculture policy was costly not only for consumers, but also for the state budget and 
the environment Moreover, it favoured surplus production and income disparities
49 op. cit.
50 Rtiegg, Erwin Neokorporatismus in der Schweiz. Ixindwirtschaftspolitik Zurich: For- 
schungstelle fur Politische Wissenschaft (KSZPW Nr 249) (1987), p. 21.
51 Halbherr, Philip und Alfred Müdespacher Agrarpolitik - Inleressenpolitik? Bern: Haupt 
(1985), pp 28-30
52 Ruffieux, Roland. Die Schweiz des Freisinns (1848-1914). In Comité pour une nouvelle 
histoire de la Suisse (ed.) Geschichte der Schweiz und der Schweizer. Ixmsanne: Payot ( 1986), 
pp. 639-730 (p. 688).
53 Jost, op. cit., p. 796.
54 Meyer, Leo and Esther Brâm “L'agriculture et la politique agricole.” In Hugger, Paul (ed ) 
Les Suisses. Modes de vie traditions mentalités (tome 3). Lausanne: Payot (1992), pp 975- 
1002 (p. 990, our translation).




























































































eralism'.56 As in agriculture, direct democracy has allowed interest groups of the 
domestic sector to oppose policy reforms favouring deregulation or liberalisation. 
For instance, until recently, powerful interest groups successfully opposed the 
adoption of a competition policy. The perverse effects of the third fundamental 
institution, namely federalism, are also worth noting in this context. Federalism 
stimulated cantonal as well as communal protectionism, for instance, in public 
procurement in the construction sector. Due to "regional preference," access to 
public procurement was severely restricted for "non-local" firms, implying that 
mostly local firms gained contracts from the communes and cantons. These dis­
tortions to free market forces prevented the creation of a truly unified economic 
market. Moreover, federalism caused barriers to the free movement of persons, 
typically because of the limited recognition of studies and diplomas.
Overall, a careful look at Swiss trade policy shows evidence of both economic 
openness and closure. Switzerland is not as liberal as might appear at first glance. 
As in foreign policy, selective exclusionary tendencies seem to be at work, here 
in the sense of a selective form of liberalism.
C. Immigration
Switzerland is often viewed as a country with a strong tradition of humanitarian 
aid and open frontiers for refugees. This view is linked to the fact that several 
humanitarian organisations like the International Red Cross (founded by the 
Swiss Henry Dunand) and the High Commission for Refugees have their head­
quarters in Switzerland. In addition, the rather considerable share of foreigners in 
the resident population -  around 25%- tends to suggest a relatively liberal immi­
gration policy. As we will show, this was true in the last century, but has become 
increasingly questionable toward the present time.
The foreign population started to increase mostly at the end of the 19th century. 
During the religious wars in the 16th century Switzerland accepted significant 
numbers of refugees.5’ De Capitani58 on the other hand, notes that in the 18th 
century the figures for immigration were rather low in Switzerland, the notable
56 Danthine, Jean-Pierre and Jean-Christian Lambelet “The Swiss Recipe: Conservative Policies 
Ain't Enough.” Economic Policy 5 (1987): 149-179 These authors argue that it is mainly the 
absence of an effective anti-trust policy, which can in turn be considered as an adverse effect of 
the Swiss 'laissez-faire', that has allowed all sorts of cartels to flourish
57 Bergier, op. cit., p. 60.
58 De Capitani, François “Beharren und Umsturz (1648-1815).” In Comité pour une nouvelle 





























































































exception being the influx of Huguenots after the revocation of the Edict of Nan­
tes. At that time between 10,000 and 20,000 refugees sought protection in Swit­
zerland.59 In the 19th century the share of foreigners was still rather low (2,5 % in 
1837 and 3 % in 1850), but these foreigners were heavily concentrated in certain 
regions: Basel and Geneva had 21.5 % and 20.1 % respectively of foreigners on 
their territory.60 According to Hoffmann-Nowotny,61 this was partly due to the 
rather limited economic attraction of Switzerland, but also to the stringent immi­
gration policy adopted by most cantons and communes.
With the foundation of the modem state in 1848, immigration policy shifted to the 
federal authority which throughout the 19th century concluded treaties with other 
countries, leading to very open borders. Together with the demands from the 
economy, which was attempting to catch up on its late industrialisation, this re­
sulted in a sharp increase in the share of the foreign population, reaching around 
15 % at the beginning of the 20th century. The immediate post-war period and the 
economic crisis of the twenties caused a significant drop in the share of foreign 
residents. Through the Second World War the share of foreign residents only rose 
slightly. This marginal increase through the war years might surprise, but Switzer­
land practised a rather restrictive refugee and immigration policy throughout those 
difficult years. An official report issued in 1957 by Karl Ludwig (member of the 
cantonal government of Bale) first broke the ice on this sensitive question. Ac­
cording to him, 10,000 Jewish refugees were rejected at the Swiss border be­
tween June 1942 and April 1945. This figure underestimates considerably, how­
ever, the true number. According to a recent study, Switzerland denied entry to 
30,000 asylum seekers, among which one finds a majority of Jewish people.62 *
Another study has also shed some new light on the widespread anti-semitist atti­
tudes among Swiss high civil servants and officials.65
59 Hoffmann-Nowotny (p 206) notes that "[b Jet ween t00,000 and 150,000 Huguenots rushed 
to Switzerland . . , but only about one tenth remained there permanently." (Hoffmann- 
Nowotny, Hans-Joachim “Switzerland ” In Hammar, Tomas (ed.) European Immigration 
Policy. A Comparative Study. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1985), pp 206-236). 
This might be linked to the fact that most cities in that time adopted a very stringent immigra­
tion policy (Hoffmann-Nowotny, ibid, and Bergier, op. cit.) The size of the population ex­
ceeded 1 million in the course of the 17th century and at the beginning o f the 18th century, 1,2 
million and towards the end of the century, 1,7 million.
60 op. cit, p. 538.
61 Hoffmann-Nowotny, op. cit, p. 206.
62 Koller, Guido “Entscheidungen uber Leben und Tod. Die behordliche Praxis in der schweiz-
erischen Fluchtlingspolitik wahrend des Zweiten Weltkrieges.” Studien und Quellen No.22
(1996). In addition, one should not forget that the "J-stamp" in Jewish passports was the result 
of a demand by the Swiss authorities. Conversely, 230,000 refugees were allowed to enter 
Switzerland (among which 22,000 Jews).




























































































Following this, the economic recovery of the fifties resulted in another increase in 
the share of the foreign population. The large share of the foreign population to­
gether with the economic crisis of the 1970s led to fears of an over-foreignization. 
Several popular initiatives attempted to limit drastically the number of foreigners 
admitted. One of these was almost passed and gave rise to a significant "course- 
correction" of the official immigration policy.
Figure 1: Share o f foreign population in Switzerland
Source: Hoffmann-Nowotny, 1985:209 and Annuaire statistique suisse, 1987-1995
The legal foundation of the current immigration policy is a constitutional article 
adopted in 1925 and the derived law adopted in 1931.61 The main instrument of 
this policy is the distribution of three types of permits: a permit of abode, a permit 
of permanent residence or a seasonal permit. Permits of abode are limited in time 
(renewable) and allow foreigners to take up a particular job Permits of perma­
nent residence give a similar status to foreigners as to the Swiss, except for politi­
cal rights. Seasonal permits, finally, are given to migrant workers in jobs such as 
construction, tourism, etc., and are limited to a maximum of nine months with a 
three-month leave requirement. 64
64 Panni, Lorena “Politica di immigrazione e polìtica di asilo in Svizzera: Due aspetti di una 
stessa logica.” In Cesari Lusso, Vittoria, Cattacin, Sandro and Cristina Allemann-Ghionda 
(ed.) /  come . . . identità, integrazione, ìnterculturalità. Zurich: Federazione delle Colonie 




























































































The distribution of permits was fairly liberal until the seventies, especially for the 
permits of temporary residence (abode). The administration of permits depended 
mostly on the demands of the economy for additional workers. Regarding permits 
of abode, the main idea was to allow for some kind of rotation among foreign mi­
grants. This policy failed, since most migrant workers decided to stay on in Swit­
zerland. Firms saw no reasons to hire new migrant workers every year or so, and 
the latter saw no reasons why they should leave their workplace to fellow foreign 
workers. Permits of residence, and even more so citizenship through naturalisa­
tion, were more difficult to obtain and submitted to important conditions on resi­
dence and employment This allowed for a flexible influx (and also outflow in 
times of economic crises)65 of migrant workers.
In the seventies, economic recession led to a falling demand for new permits and 
as a consequence to a decrease in the share of foreign residents.66 67*At the same 
time, as a reaction to the fears of over-foreignization and the popular initiative, 
which was almost accepted, the government changed course and rendered the 
obtaining of permits of abode much more difficult. Quotas, based on the esti­
mated demands of the economy, were established and strictly respected. On the 
other hand, the obtaining of permits of permanent residence was facilitated.61
Despite a relative openness in terms of admission policy, there was not a strong 
incorporation of foreigners into the society. According to Soysal,“ Switzerland 
has a "liberal" policy of incorporation based on a decentralised structure. Incorpo­
ration is left to the civil society and the working environment. While the immi­
gration rules are largely an affair of the federal state, the incorporation and espe­
cially naturalisation occurs or is supposed to occur at the level of the communes 
and the cantons. For the naturalisation process this division of competencies often 
adds an additional hurdle to the process, since each canton and commune is free 
to impose additional residence requirements. While a foreigner has to reside for at 
least ten years in Switzerland to be able to apply for naturalisation, sometimes 
longer periods are required. Some cantons require certain periods of stay on their
65 See King, Russell “European International Migration 1945-1990: A Statistical and Geo­
graphical Overview ” In King, Russell (ed.) Mass Migration in Europe. The legacy and the 
Future. London: Belhaven Press (1993), pp. 19-39.
66 The outflow of migrant workers was also due to the fact that they were not covered by so­
cial security (Cattacin, Sandro ‘“ Il federalismo integrativo.’ Qualche considerazione sulle mo­
dalità di integrazione degli immigranti in Swizzera.” In Cesari Lusso, Vittoria, Cattacin, San­
dro and Cristina Allemann-Ghionda (ed.) I come . . . identità, integrazione, interculturalità 
Ziirich: Federazione delle Colonie Libere Italiane in Swizzera (1996), pp 67-82).
67 Hoffmann-Nowotny, op. cit, p 219 shows that in 1970 a majority of the foreign population 
had permits o f abode, while from 1975 the majority had permits of permanent residence.
“  Soysal, Yasemin Nuhoglu Limits o f Citizenship. Migrants and Postnational Membership in 




























































































territory which limits the mobility of foreigners and creates an additional hurdle to 
naturalisation. Consequently, the federalist structure has exclusionary effects at 
this level.
Evidence for similar effects of the federalist structure can be found in the low 
level of expenditure for foreign migrants. Soysal” notes that for vocational train­
ing the Swiss governments (federal and cantonal) spent about 2 Sff (1.4 $) per 
worker in 1982. At the same time a worker in the Netherlands could count on 
80.5 FI (42 $) on average. Similarly, Soysal™ also links the rather low naturalisa­
tion rates in Switzerland (1.5 % of the foreign population in 1976; 1.8 % in 1980 
and 0.8 % in 1990) to this liberal incorporation policy. Other consequences are 
the lack of civil rights, even at the local level (except in two cantons), and the lit­
tle effort that is made in the school system to facilitate the integration of the chil­
dren of migrant workers .’1
Direct democracy has also tended to nurture exclusion. For instance, in some 
communes the local assembly of all the citizens has to vote on the attribution of 
Swiss citizenship.69 7012 Instruments of direct democracy have more generally been 
well-suited to channel anti-foreigner expressions. They explain why resentment 
against foreigners emerged much earlier in Switzerland than in most other devel­
oped countries. Following the near adoption of a very severe constitutional 
amendment in the late sixties, direct democracy strongly influenced the change of 
course that occurred in the 1970s. The relative closure of the borders for potential 
immigrants throughout the Second World War, on the other hand, is closely 
linked to the third institutional cornerstone of Switzerland. Neutrality and the fear 
of being overrun by powerful neighbours resulted in a very restrictive handling of 
refugees. As figure 1 clearly shows, the share of the foreign population hardly in­
creased during that time
In short, the picture of Switzerland as a country with a strong humanitarian tradi­
tion describes accurately the situation of the 19th and early 20th centuries. Since 
that time, however, the immigration policy has become more restrictive in nature. 
The Swiss immigration policy is “liberal” not in the sense that it offers free access 
for immigrants or reffrgees, but because it provides the private economy with a 
flexible management of the labour policy.
69 ibid, p. 56.
70 ibid, p 25.
71 Cattacin, op. cit.




























































































4. The difficult nexus between identity and exclusion
In the previous section we highlighted how exclusionary practices went together 
with the creation and the strengthening of Swiss national identity. The key to suc­
cess was the continuous role of political institutions as identification magnets. 
Through selective exclusion and skilful redistribution, these institutions were able 
to absorb the shocks coming from the external environment. Their task has, how­
ever, become more difficult in the last decade, and the first signs of failure have 
uncovered dangerous internal strains. In this section, we turn to a discussion of 
these recent developments
Two major events have had far-reaching consequences for Swiss institutions and 
hence for Swiss identity, namely, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
globalisation process. The former has strongly challenged the raison d'etre of a 
policy of neutrality. Balancing behaviour has become ill-adapted to a less polar­
ised world. The latter has highlighted both the limits and costs of exclusionary 
practices. Switzerland is largely integrated in an increasingly interdependent 
world, characterised by multiple channels of interactions between and among 
domestic societies. Consequently, the maintenance of exclusionary practices 
faces an increasing number of obstacles.
In sum, changes in the external environment require increased economic and po­
litical openness -  in other words, lower levels of exclusion -  notably in the three 
arenas discussed above: foreign involvement, trade and immigration. External 
pressure is, however, not sufficient to ensure domestic change, especially given 
that the institutional set-up was designed to privilege stability rather than innova­
tion. The institutions provide powerful veto tools to those who oppose lowering 
the level of exclusion. As such they have been seen as responsible for current 
difficulties by those favouring change. The net result has been an erosion of the 
role played by the institutions in rallying the Swiss population around their na­
tional identity, and thus a loosening of the feeling of belonging. Coupled with the 
impact of economic recession, these developments have led to a kind of identity 
crisis. We develop these points and highlight how and why Swiss national iden­
tity is affected by external changes in the domains of foreign involvement, trade, 
and immigration.
A. Foreign involvement (or the difficulty to include oneself)
The collapse of the Berlin wall and the subsequent démocratisation process in 
Eastern Europe had deep repercussion on Swiss identity. First, these dramatic 




























































































threat. The shock was all the more sudden since the Swiss conception of the out­
side world, and its policy implications, had hardly changed since the 1930s.” Ex­
ternal threats, among others the Habsburg empire, Napoleon, the Third Reich, 
and the Communist block, had been carefully cultivated by political and eco­
nomic elites as a justification for both external behaviour and internal cohesion. 
Tlie sudden disappearance of the Soviet Union and its communist satellites ruined 
decades of efforts to build the image of a common enemy and thus deprived the 
Swiss citizens of a significant part of their national identity. The absence of a 
common enemy -  an "Other" that served as a reference to which every member of 
the society could rapidly contrast her differences and thus recognise her equals -  
makes the process of collective self-definition much more problematic.
Second, the end of the East-West division in Europe was a blow to the external 
function of neutrality. The significance of neutrality had already been altered at 
the beginning of the 1960s by the reconciliation of West European states and the 
creation of the European Community, but the end of the Cold War was the deci­
sive element in this.13 4 15Among all the European neutral states, Switzerland was the 
most affected by this change both because it had the strictest neutrality, and be­
cause neutrality was at the heart of the national identity. The definition of a new 
course has thus been difficult and politically sensitive. The government favours a 
more active involvement in foreign affairs and a loosening of the conception of 
neutrality.” This is based on the main idea that in the era of globalisation a coun­
try like Switzerland can no longer defend its independence by a strategy of insu­
lation from the outside world. Traditional sovereignty becomes an illusion, be­
cause Switzerland is increasingly forced to adopt decisions made by others. In­
ternational co-operation is the only route to defend national independence. From 
this perspective, the Swiss federal government envisions a definition of Swiss 
neutrality that would limit itself to its core elements -  rights and obligations in 
time of war -  but would leave room for manoeuvre in other situations, including
13 Kreis, Georg “La question de l'identité nationale.” In Hugger, Paul (ed.) Les Suisses. Modes 
de vie, traditions, mentalités (2). Lausane: Payot (1992), pp. 781-800 (p. 791).
74 e g Biitler, Hugo “Der europàische Aufbruch und die helvetische Identitàtskrise.” Eu- 
ropaische Rundschau 19 (2) (1991): 3-9. Some experts also point to the fact that neutrality is 
useless to cope with new forms of threat such as terrorism, environmental damages, or drug 
flows. Quite the contrary, it prevents Switzerland from fighting efficiently against these threats 
since it restricts the possibilities for taking part in international co-operation efforts (e g. Brun­
ner, Hans Peter “L'importance de la neutralité comme moyen d'affirmer l'indépendance suisse 
dans une Europe intégrée ” In Ruffieux, Roland (ed.) Ixt Suisse et son avenir européen 
Lausanne: Payot (1989), p. 112).
15 See the report on "the Swiss foreign policy in the 1990s" (Conseil fédéral “Rapport sur la 





























































































that of economic sanctions.16 *In other words, the Swiss government suggests 
maintaining neutrality for the "case of emergency",11 and giving priority to soli­
darity with the international community and co-operation in supranational institu­
tions. This conceptual change led the government to suggest that Switzerland join 
the United Nations and the European Union.18 These proposals have found little 
support among the population: Swiss citizens have still a strong attachment with 
the traditional neutrality.19 Only a minority of these would be ready to admit that 
neutrality has lost its raison d'être.
The disagreement between the elite and the people on the reorientation of neu­
trality is only one aspect of a growing gap between different definitions of foreign 
policy. Proposals from the elites that are subject to referendums have faced a 
higher risk of being rejected in this field than in other policy domains since the 
1970s.80 This is all the more problematic given that direct democratic institutions 
will play a significant role in future definitions of Swiss foreign policy -  contrary 
to past practices. This change comes from two main factors: the increasing per­
vasion of domestic politics by international affairs through the process of globali­
sation, and the partial revision of the Swiss constitution in 1977 that greatly en­
larged the scope of direct public scrutiny on foreign policy affairs.
The gap between the government's agenda and people's beliefs has also been 
striking on matters of European integration. The popular vote against the EEA on 
December 6, 1992, constitutes a case in hand. This vote divided the Swiss elec­
torate along a new dimension of the level of openness versus closedness of the
16 This means a return to the "differential neutrality" of the period of Switzerland's participation 
in the League of Nations (see above).
”  Gabriel, Jiirg Martin “Neutralitàt fur den Notfall: Der Bericht des Bundesrates zur Aussen- 
politik der Schweiz in den 90er Jahren.” Schweizerische Zeitschrift fu r  Politische Wissenschaft 
1 (2-3) (1995): 163-191.
18 Conseil fédéral Rapport sur la question d ’une adhesion de la Suisse à la Communauté eu­
ropéenne Berne: FF IV (1992); Conseil fédéral (1993), op. cit.
19 There is a huge gap between the "objective" conception of neutrality, i.e. its function as a 
tool to achieve independence, and the subjective conception of it, i.e the opinion and feeling 
that every citizen has developed towards Swiss neutrality, (Brunner, op. cit.).
80 Papadopoulos, Yannis “Les votations fédérales comme indicateur de soutien aux autorités.” 
In Papadopoulos, Yannis (ed.) Elites politiques et peuple en Suisse. Analyse des votations 
fédérales: 1970-1987. Lausanne: Réalités sociales (1994), pp. 113-160, Sciarini, Pascal 
“Opinion publique et politique extérieure.” Revue d ’Allemagne 28 (3) (1996a): 337-352. On 
the other hand, foreign policy is the field where the optional referendum has been the least 
employed in the decades following the Second World War (Sciarini, 1996a, op c i t , Trechsel, 
Alexandre and Pascal Sciarini “Direct Democracy in Switzerland: Do Elites matter?” European 




























































































country1,1 According to a survey poll, half of the arguments given by the ”no” side 
in response to an open-ended question reflect a defence of Swiss traditions,81 *3 i.e. 
the fear of a threat to the existence of traditional Switzerland through integration 
in the EEA (loss of sovereignty, fear of the EU system, etc.). Cultural motives 
have also been decisive on the “yes” side: arguments regarding the fear of isola­
tion, the desire to open the country up to the outside world account for more than 
half of the “yes” arguments. In other words, whereas supporters of the EEA 
wanted to loosen the exclusionary tendencies and promote an open Switzerland, 
opponents wanted to defend the traditional Switzerland that defends its myths and 
venerates the courage of remaining alone.
Problematic for the country's unity was the fact that the different linguistic regions 
held strongly opposing views on this dimension. The French-speaking cantons 
supported openness while the German-speaking cantons -  and more especially 
the small rural ones -  and the Italian-speaking canton supported closedness.83 
This has led several analysts to argue that the country is experiencing an identity 
crisis. To improve relations between the linguistic communities, an official report
81 Kriesi, Hanspeter, Longchamp, Claude, Passy, Florence and Pascal Sciarini “Analyse de la 
votation fédérale du 6 décembre 1992 (EEE).” Genève/Beme: Département de Science Poli- 
tique/GfS-Forschungsinstitut, Analyse-Vox No 47 (1993), Sciarini, Pascal and Ola Listhaug 
“Single Cases or a Unique Pair? The Swiss and Norwegian 'No' to Europe.” Journal o f  Com­
mon Market Studies 35 (3) (1997); Vatter, Adrian “Der EWR Entscheid: Kulturelle Identitât, 
rationales Kalkul oder Struktureller Kontext?” Schweizerische Zeitschrift fu r  Soziologie 20 (1) 
(1994): 15-42. First identified in the analysis o f the structural and cultural cleavages of Swiss 
politics that emerged on national referendums during the 1980s on issues relating to the army, 
labour and foreigners (Sardi, Massimo and Eric Widmer “L'orientation du vote ” In Kriesi, 
Hanspeter (ed.) Citoyenneté et démocratie. Compétence, participation et décision des citoyens 
et citoyennes suisses. Zurich: Seismo (1993), 191-212), this conflict seems particularly salient 
in referendums on foreign policy (Sciarini, 1996a, op cit .). For instance, it expressed itself in 
the popular vote against the creation of a Swiss blue helmets corps in 1994 (Wemli, Boris, 
Sciarini, Pascal and José Barranco “Analyse-VOX des votations fédérales du 12 juin.” Zu- 
rich/Genève: GfS/Département de science politique (1994)).
83 Kriesi et al. 1993, op. cit., p. 44.
83 According to opinion polls, French-speaking citizens have felt more European than German­
speaking citizens for several years (Kriesi et al 1993, op. cit., p. 11), and the priority given to 
European integration is significantly higher among the former (Widmer, Thomas and Christo­
phe Buri “Briissel oder Bern: schlâgt das Herz der "Romands" eher fîir Europa?” Annuaire 
suisse de science politique 32 (1992): 363-387 (p 367)). One reason for this could be the fear 
o f Germany. The French-speaking community, conversely, might conceive of Europe as a way 
to "free" itself from the domination of the German-speaking cantons. More generally, a study 
of the linguistic cleavage in Switzerland shows that foreign policy is one of the fields where the 
opposition between the French-speaking and German-speaking regions is the strongest (Kriesi, 
Hanspeter, Wemli, Boris, Sciarini, Pascal et Matteo Gianni. Le clivage linguistique: problèmes 





























































































issued by a group of Committees of the Swiss Parliament has suggested relying 
on the leeway offered by federalism. Given the prior contributions of federalism 
in terms of "management of differences" (see above), this recommendation is 
hardly novel, in addition, it is unlikely to offer a convincing solution in the current 
era characterised as it is by increased interdependence.84 Solutions based on an 
autonomy of the cantons would seem to be inappropriate. Instead of relying on 
the federalist structure it might be necessary to reconceptualise the role it is 
playing presently in the current Swiss institutional arrangements.
Federalism gives also rise to tensions in another guise. In requiring a double ma­
jority for constitutional amendments it has lead to an increasing number of friction 
between the votes of the citizens and the votes of the cantons. This has particu­
larly been the case on issues of involvement in European affairs. The requirement 
of the majority of cantons gives a strong blocking power to the conservative rural 
Swiss-German cantons and thus impedes any change of course, despite the 
growing public support for such a move. The referendum on entry into the EE A 
reflected this worrying development. The popular vote was almost perfectly split, 
whereas the vote of the cantons was largely against the proposal. Given that the 
core of small conservative cantons shows no sign of changing their stance, there 
is little prospect for a more open-minded attitude toward European integration in 
the next few years.85 And the corollary will presumably be a further erosion of the 
identity cement.
Lowering the level of exclusion in foreign policy, especially towards the Euro­
pean Union, proves to be a source of conflict both between the elite and the peo­
ple and among the citizens.86 The three fundamental institutions are either the ob­
ject of the struggle (especially that of neutrality, but also those of federalism and 
direct democracy due to the globalisation process) or else act as channels for 
voicing any opposition to changes (especially those of direct democracy and fed­
eralism).
84 Kriesi et al., 1996, op. cit.
85 Accordingly, various proposals aiming at reforming the double-majority rule in the sense of a 
reduction of small cantons' veto power have been elaborated. For a summary and discussion of 
these proposals, see Vatter, Adrian and Fritz Sager ‘Tederalismusreform am Beispiel des 
Stàndemehrs.” In Hug, Simon and Pascal Sciarmi (eds.) Staatsreform - Im  réforme des institu­
tions - Institutional Reforms. Ziirich: Seismo (1996) (Special issue of the Swiss Political Sci­
ence Review 2(2)): 165-200
86 Hug, Simon and Pascal Sciarmi “Switzerland: Still a Paradigmatic Case?” In Schneider, 
Gerald, Weitsman, Patricia A. and Thomas Bemauer (eds.) Towards a New Europe: Stops and 





























































































With respect to trade, strong pressures towards lowering the level of exclusion 
arose from the international arena in the late 1980s. The rising international com­
petition highlighted the need for internal structural adjustments that would im­
prove the situation of the externally oriented sector. However, these adjustments 
challenged the dual economic policy, because they required the progressive de­
regulation of the internally-oriented sector. Thus, external opportunities for the 
export-oriented sector became threats for the internally-oriented sector. This di­
vision applied both to regional developments -  the road toward a single European 
market -  and to global ones -  the expanding agenda of the GATT.81 *The two 
cases have led to different results regarding the change in the levels of exclusion.
The Uruguay round of talks in the GATT brought about a lowering of the barriers 
in the Swiss agricultural policy. Thanks to external pressure, state actors were 
able to build a strong coalition with the export-oriented sector and overrode the 
opposition of the farm lobby.88 Both external economic and political develop­
ments had weakened the position of farmers. In particular, a major blow for them 
was the diminishing relevance of a strict neutrality, and of its requirement to 
maintain independence in food supplies. In this particular case, direct democracy 
did not impede the reform process, but instead stimulated it: the rejection on 
March 12, 1995, by Swiss citizens of a constitutional amendment in the field of 
agriculture, which was seen as not pushing sufficiently towards liberalisation and 
ecology,89 led to a strengthening of the reform.90 It paved the way for the adoption
81 According to an official study the largest share of the expected 0.4 to 0 6 percent additional
economic growth per year due to the integration into the common market would have been
due to the liberalisation of the so far protected domestic sectors o f Swiss economy (Hauser, 
Heinz Traité sur l'EEE. Adhésion à la CE. Course en solitaire. Conséquences économiques 
pour la Suisse. Berne: Office fédéral des questions conjoncturelles (1991), pp. 48-52).
88 As a result of the veto power of the farm lobby, Switzerland took refuge in a position that
was primarily defensive during the first four years of the Round. Taking advantage of interna­
tional pressure, the State authorities, supported by the export-oriented sector, skirt the agricul­
tural veto when the GATT offer was being drafted in October 1990. Although modest, this 
offer put the Swiss agricultural policy on the path to liberalisation. This case shows the limits 
of internal solidarity: In hard times, the externally-oriented sectors no longer agreed to subsi­
dising the domestic economy. See Sciarini, 1994, op cit.; Sciarini, Pascal “Réseau politique 
interne et négociations internationales: le GATT, levier de la réforme agricole suisse.” Revue
suisse de science politique 1 (2-3) (1995): 225-252; Sciarini, Pascal. “Elaboration of the Swiss 
Agricultural Policy for the GATT Negotiations: A Network Analysis.” Swiss Journal o f  Soci­
ology 22 (1) (1996b): 85-115.
89 Sciarini, Pascal, Marquis, Lionel and Boris Wemli “Analyse-VOX des votations fédérales du 
12 mars ” Zurich/Genève: GfS/Département de science politique (1995)




























































































of a much more progressive constitutional article accepted by referendum in 
1996.”
The government has been less successful in lowering economic barriers with the 
European community. When the EEA talks started, the Swiss wanted the four 
freedoms of movement (goods, capital, services and persons) to apply wherever 
and whenever this would prove to be beneficial. More precisely, Switzerland de­
manded the exclusion of some sectors from liberalisation efforts, in order to pro­
tect them from European competition. The EU, however, opposed any permanent 
derogation to the "acquis communautaire" that would threaten the "homogeneity 
of the European space”. The bargaining turned out to be a bitter experience for 
the Swiss government, which realised that there was no way it could obtain à la 
carte participation. Under the Swiss Presidency, the EFTA countries tried to 
trade some of requests for permanent derogations to the four freedoms against a 
right of codecision for future choices regarding the EEA. This strategy, however, 
failed,” and the EEA negotiation process ended in a major diplomatic defeat for 
Switzerland.* 93 A sense of defeat pervaded the general public, and nurtured a 
strong movement against participation in European affairs and in favour of con­
tinued isolation. The end result was the public rejection of the EEA treaty in De­
cember 1992.
C. Immigration
Like many other countries, Switzerland faces the challenge of increasing migra­
tion. This shift takes mainly two forms: first, the increase of immigration from the 
southern to the northern hemisphere, in particular of asylum seekers. Second, 
Switzerland has been repeatedly asked by the European Union to loosen its im­
migration policy, if not to actually take part in the completion of the free move­
ment of workers on the continent. This issue was at the heart of the EEA negotia­
tions and is again the cornerstone of the ongoing bilateral talks between Switzer­
land and the EU.
” Hug, Simon, Marquis, Lionel and Boris Wemli “Analyse-VOX des votations fédérales du 9 
juin 1996. Berne/ Geneve: GfS/Département de science politique.
93 Dupont, Cédric Domestic Politics, Information and International Bargaining. Comparative 
Models o f  Strategie Behaviour in Non-Crisis Negotiations PhD. dissertation Graduate Insti­
tute o f International Studies, Geneva (1994a), Sciarini, Pascal “La Suisse dans la négociation 
sur l'Espace économique européen: de la rupture à l'apprentissage ” Annuaire suisse de science 
politique 32 (1992): 297-322.
93 See Sciarini, 1992, op. cit., for an argument that Swiss dites learned from the initial dead­
locks, in the sense that they intended to use the EEA as a leverage for the necessary restructu­
ration of the domestic economy. Dupont (1994a), op cit., demonstrates that this learning did 




























































































Access to the Swiss labour market has been a special concern for EU southern 
countries (Italy, Spain and Portugal), the most important providers of the Swiss 
foreign workforce.9" In the initial phase of the EEA negotiations, Switzerland tried 
to escape from the implementation of the free movement of persons and asked for 
a permanent derogation to this rule. This request was not compatible with the EU 
intransigence regarding the "homogeneity of the European space" Switzerland 
ultimately gained only a temporary derogation (seven years) during which any 
barrier to the free movement of persons should be progressively removed. Fear of 
an uncontrolled inflow of foreign workers that would threaten Swiss jobs was a 
major issue during the referendum campaign. Accordingly, the free movement of 
people was an important argument for Swiss citizens who wrote a no on the bal­
lot on December 6, 199294 5 After the rejection of the EEA agreement, talks with 
the EU have been renewed on a bilateral basis. The free mobility of persons has 
again been a central issue -  the cornerstone of the talks together with the issue of 
transportation.96 Whereas the EU insists that the final agreement should include 
provisions for the complete freedom of movement for persons, the Swiss authori­
ties argue that this goal will certainly lead to a rejection in a popular vote and do 
not agree to removing the system of permits and quotas.91
Besides being challenged by European demands, the Swiss immigration policy is 
more generally at the centre of the domestic political scene. Swiss attempts to
94 Together with agricultural trade or Swiss participation in the structural fonds, the EU has 
often justified its demands in this field on the grounds of the so-called "cohesion" concept, i.e. 
the idea that Switzerland's access to the European market for goods and services (and the re­
lated benefits it gains) should be paid by a contribution to EU actions towards enhancing the 
standard of living in the poorer countries of the Union
95 Opposition to the free movement of people was the argument mentioned by one no-voter out 
o f ten to justify their choice (response to an open-ended question, see Kriesi et al 1993, op 
cit., p. 44).
96 Given the experience with the EEA, the EU wanted to protect itself against a possible new 
popular rejection . Therefore, it insists on the “parallelism of the talks”, i.e. that any agreement 
on a given topic is dependent on the acceptance of an agreement in another issue area. The 
implicit EU desire is to avoid Swiss citizens saying yes to an agreement on an issue in which 
Switzerland has an interest, but vetoing any agreement on a sensitive issue, typically on the 
free movement of persons.
91 Accordingly, they initially suggested only qualitative improvements o f the immigration pol­
icy. In the meantime, a compromise has been reached (but is still dependent on an agreement 
on the whole package). It envisions a sophisticated system of safeguard clauses that Switzer­
land could use during a (long) temporary period. The final goal o f free movement is main­
tained, but will be implemented only in 2004 and with a right for Switzerland to reintroduce 
quotas in 2005 and 2006 in the case of high levels o f immigration The free movement of peo­





























































































control the inflow of foreign workers with the help of the system of permits and 
quotas is in fact a failure, since 80% of the immigrants are not concerned by the 
quotas and hence escape any control today .98 In addition, the reunion of families 
has resulted in a significant increase of foreigners of second and third generations. 
As a solution, the Swiss authorities have suggested providing them with a facili­
tated naturalisation procedure. This proposal was, however, rejected in a popular 
vote in 1994.
Recent official proposals in the field of immigration include the so-called "model 
of three circles".99 According to this, foreign workers would be divided into three 
categories: the interior circle would provide free access to the Swiss labour mar­
ket to workers of the EEA space (EFT A and EU countries); the middle circle en­
visions only a limited recruitment of workers from the US, Canada, and in the 
future possibly from Eastern Europe; the exterior circle, with no possibility of re­
cruitment (apart from a few exceptions), would apply to the rest of the world. 
What is new in this model is the fact that in addition to the economic criteria, on 
which immigration policy has been based so far, a distinction is introduced con­
cerning the cultural origins of the migrant worker. In that sense, the Swiss immi­
gration policy would be driven by explicitly ethnic-cultural considerations.100
This proposal, which is the direct response to an inquiry by a committee of the 
National Council, has not yet been debated in parliament. The idea is to introduce 
this “model of three circles” into the law of abode and residence for foreigners 
(“Loi sur le séjour et l’établissement des étrangers”). Given the uncertainty due to 
the current negotiations with the European Union and some recent pending initia­
tives, the government has refrained from submitting the revised law to the parlia­
ment. Despite this lack of a legal foundation, some elements of the “model of 
three circles” have found their application in executive ordinances.101
This seems to suggest that since discrimination against citizens from other Euro­
pean countries is now more difficult to maintain, the discrimination has shifted to 
other geographical areas. In some sense, this shift results in a redefinition of the 
Other, which has become geographically more distant. The process of identifica­
tion, however, still seems to require this reference to the Other. Evidence of this 
tendency can be found in recent popular initiatives concerning immigration. One
98 Chambovey, Didier “Politique à l'égard des étrangers et contingentement de l'immigration. 
L'exemple de la Suisse ” Population INED 2 (1995): 357-384.
99 Conseil fédéral Rapport du Conseil fédéral sur la politique à l'égard des étrangers et des 
réfugiés du 15 mai 1991, Feuille Fédérale III, 27 (1991).
100 Parini, op. cit.
101 Foreigners with a seasonal work-permit from outside the EFTA or EC countries, for in­




























































































of them envisions a reduction in the share of the foreign population to 18 % of the 
total population, while another, rejected in December 1996, proposed cracking 
down on illegal immigrants. This is an additional illustration of the role of direct 
democracy in the expression of exclusionary tendencies.
5. Conclusion
What are the main features of the process of national identity-building in Switzer­
land? First, and foremost, the cornerstones of this have been provided by the po­
litical institutions, in particular the triad consisting of federalism, direct democ­
racy, and neutrality. The resulting institutional framework has gradually become 
the rallying points of collective feeling in belonging to Swiss society. Patriotism is 
thus primarily "constitutional",102 and the Other is someone who does not share 
the public sphere delimited by these three key institutions. Second, the strength­
ening of collective identity has been compounded by exclusionary practices in the 
policy domains of foreign involvement, trade and immigration. The policy of 
neutrality has accounted for the extreme restraint shown in international political 
affairs and has helped justify high levels of protection to several sectors, in par­
ticular, agriculture, on the grounds of national independence and self-sufficiency, 
just as it also cultivated a very restrictive refugee policy during the difficult times 
of the Third Reich. Immigration policy, by itself, appears very liberal, in that the 
search for adequate regulations has been largely left to economic actors. How­
ever, neither direct democracy nor federalism, which generated a very decentral­
ised decision-making process in several domains, have favoured an active incor­
poration policy.
Put together, these features imply that the process of identity formation in Swit­
zerland has not escaped the trade-off between exclusion and dilution. As the 
Swiss case seems to suggest, even a national identity based on "constitutional 
patriotism" needs some barriers to protect itself. The current problems that Swit­
zerland is facing confirm this conclusion. Demands from the outside concerning 
exclusion levels -  which are closely linked to the main institutional features of 
Switzerland -  have upset the delicate balance inside the country. Changes in the 
institutional set-up appear to be necessary and these changes question the very 
bases of the Swiss national identity. Interestingly, Gottfried Keller, a Swiss 
author of the 19th century, envisioned the Swiss political institutions as a bulwark 
against the authoritarian regimes surrounding the country. He even considered 
that the Swiss institutions, and Switzerland in itself, would become obsolete if the




























































































surrounding regimes turned democratic.* 10405 This argument was echoed in the slo­
gan "700 years are enough" that Swiss intellectuals created for the 700th anniver­
sary of Switzerland in 1991. Again, this seems to suggest that the exclusions that 
Switzerland has practised over the period of its existence as a nation-state were 
intimately linked to the successful formation and maintenance of a common mul­
ticultural identity.
Thus, the Swiss case seems to suggest promising avenues for the construction of 
a European identity, but at the same time it also signals possible dangerous con­
sequences. The main positive insight appears to be that "constitutional patriotism" 
is not simply a theoretical construct but that it has been successfully implemented. 
The Swiss case provides some support to those who argue that an European 
constitution and a popular ratification, leading to a social legitimisation of the 
European Union, are a necessary step.104 However, the view that European citi­
zens will acquiesce to being part of a new “nation” as soon as the constitutional 
and political structure is put in place105 is too simplistic. Contrary to Marquardt,106 
who seems to suggest that a constitution matters irrespective of its content, the 
Swiss case shows that the specific institutions chosen play a crucial role. Consti­
tutional patriotism requires an institutional set-up which allows for loyalty and the 
voice of the lower units and their citizens. In Switzerland, managed subsidiarity 
and direct avenues of influence for citizens have helped to build-up a conver­
gence of expectations and ultimately resulted in a collective feeling of belonging. 
On the negative side, the Swiss experience shows how difficult it is to avoid ex­
clusionary tendencies in the process of strengthening identification with the col­
lective. There seems to be a need for an Other and for high levels of exclusion to 
preserve the multicultural balance.
What does this tell us for the future of a European identity? Can the European 
Union pick only the raisins of the Swiss cake, as some scholars suggest?1"1 First, 
the Swiss case points to the necessity of designing central political institutions 
that can become the rallying point of a collective identity. Constitutional patriot­
ism cannot emerge without a constitution and its structural apparatus. In Switzer­
land, this has meant moving from a loose confederation of cantons to a true fed­
eral state with a clear hierarchy of power and responsibilities. It is highly unlikely
105 Muschg, Adolf “Wieviel Identitat braucht die Schweiz?” WeltwocheSupplement (April 
1996).
104 e g. Weiler, op. cit. and Marquardt, Paul D. “Deficit Reduction: Democracy, Technocracy, 
and Constitutionalism in the European Union.” Duke Journal o f  Comparative and Interna­
tional Ixtw 4 (2) (1994): 265-290
105 Howe, op. cit. p. 34.
106 op cit., p. 284.




























































































that the EU is ready to make such a move, at least in the short and medium terms. 
A widespread position is that the Union will remain a kind of “objet politique non 
identifié,” a mixture of confederation, federation, or even medieval forms of po­
litical organisation. Without claiming that the specific institutional design elabo­
rated in Switzerland is the only one that can serve as an anchor for a collective 
identity, the question remains whether an opaque political construction such as 
the EU (at the present or as it is likely to become in the future) will be able to 
achieve this goal.
Second, the Swiss experience casts doubt on the possibility of furthering both 
widening and deepening efforts. The two can go together when widening does not 
extend to the existing Other, or at least goes together with a redefinition of the 
Other.108 The latter possibility implies that subsequent rounds of widening must 
allow for restive periods during which images of the Other have to be recon­
structed. In more concrete terms, internal consolidation seems to require external 
caution. Recent developments inside the European Union tend to confirm this 
view. The Single European Act gave birth to the idea of a “Fortress Europe” 
where the common enemy was implicitly viewed as the competition from South 
East Asian countries (and the US), although decision-makers have tried to tone 
down this defensive posture in the meantime. Still on the issue of trade, active 
participation in world liberalising trends has fostered internal strains, in particular 
regarding farm products. Aggressive behaviour and the bitter row with the United 
States during the Uruguay Round of talks ended in a division between France and 
its partners.1"’ Similarly, expansion to the Central and Eastern European countries 
has been strongly opposed by those who consider the Common Agricultural Pol­
icy (CAP) to be a cornerstone of the Union. From this perspective, the likely dis­
mantling of the CAP that would follow an enlargement to the East would be a 
blow to the cement of the Community.
On foreign involvement, there have been few signs of any movement being made 
toward an active common foreign and security policy. More important, the few 
efforts which have been made in this direction have revealed dangerous strains. 
Germany’s push for a common recognition of Slovenia and Croatia triggered a 
major crisis and has since then relegated the Union to a secondary role in the 
Balkan crisis. Similarly, the Union has been very reluctant to take the lead in de- *105
108 Neumann, Iver B. “Self and Other in International Relations.” European Journal o f  Inter­
national Relations. 2(2) (1996): 139-174, Neumann, Iver B. “European Identity, EU Expan­
sion and the Integration/Exclusion Nexus”, In Lars-Erik Cederman (ed ), Defining and Project­
ing Europe ’.v Identity: Issues and Trade-Offs (forthcoming)..
105 Dupont, Cédric and Pascal Sciarini “La négociation agricole Etats-Unis - Communauté eu­





























































































signing new security arrangements for Central and Eastern Europe. It has also left 
participation in humanitarian actions to the discretion of individual members.
On immigration and internal security, the Schengen agreement is the first example 
of the institutionalisation of a multitiered Union with variable exclusion levels. 
More significantly, the agreement reflects the need for exclusion, in particular vis- 
à-vis Mediterranean neighbours. Finally, the case of the Economic and Monetary 
integration (EMU) reveals exclusion both internally and externally. On the one 
hand, decision-makers have gone back to the exclusionary message that was 
highly present in the late 1960s when the early plans for monetary integration 
emerged. A single European currency is supposed to upgrade the role of Europe 
vis-à-vis the United States in the conduct of international monetary affairs. The 
image of a common enemy is thus used to foster more integration and help people 
identify with the supranational collective. On the other hand, there is an intensive 
debate inside the Community on the limits of internal exclusion. Who will be the 
ins and outs?"0 Too much exclusion or too little will both erode support: too much 
will dilute the original cement of solidarity, whereas too little will weaken effi­
ciency and thus its appeal for the public.
In sum, our analysis of the formation of Swiss national identity offers few easy 
recipes for the construction of a European identity. In particular, Switzerland ap­
pears as both an example and an exception. It is an example of successful inte­
gration and identity creation in a multicultural society. But at the same time it is 
an exception in the sense that this successful identity formation is not unrelated to 
the particular historical period in which it occurred. In addition, its association 
with exclusionary tendencies toward the external world makes it less popular for 
imitation. Thus, there seems to be little prospect of an easy road for the European 
Union toward the elusive emergence of a collective identity, as has been con­
firmed by some of its recent policy developments.
110 On this debate, see the special contributions in the Swiss Political Science Review (vol 2:1, 































































































EUI Working Papers are published and distributed by the 
European University Institute, Florence
Copies can be obtained free of charge 
-  depending on the availability of stocks -  from:
The Publications Officer 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy



























































































Publications of the European University Institute
To The Publications Officer
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) -  Italy 





□  Please send me a complete list of EUI Working Papers
□  Please send me a complete list of EUI book publications
□  Please send me the EUI brochure Academic Year 1997/98









































































































Implementing a Climate Change Strategy in 
the European Union: Obstacles and 
Opportunities
RSC No. 96/2 
Jonathan GOLUB 
Sovereignty and Subsidiarity in EU 
Environmental Policy
RSC No. 96/3 
Jonathan GOLUB
State Power and Institutional Influence in 




Intégration ou désintégration? Cinq thèses
sur l’incidence de l’intégration européenne
sur les structures étatiques
RSC No. 96/5
Jens RASMUSSEN 
Integrating Scientific Expertise into 
Regulatory Decision-Making.
Risk Management Issues - Doing Things 
Safely with Words: Rules and Laws
RSC No. 9„,o 
Olivier GODARD 
Integrating Scientific Expertise into 
Regulatory Decision-Making.
Social Decision-Making under Conditions o f 
Scientific Controversy, Expertise and the 
Precautionary Principle
RSC No. 96/7 
Robert HANKIN
Integrating Scientific Expertise into 
Regulatory Decision-Making.
The Cases o f Food and Pharmaceuticals
RSC No. 96/8 
Ernesto PREVIDI 
Integrating Scientific Expertise into 
Regulatory Decision-Making.
L ’organisation des responsabilités publiques 
et privées dans la régulation européenne des 




RSC No. 96/9 
Josef FALKE
Integrating Scientific Expertise into 
Regulatory Decision-Making.
The Role o f Non-governmental 
Standardization Organizations in the 




Integrating Scientific Expertise into 
Regulatory Decision-Making.
Scientific Expertise in Social Regulation and 
the European Court o f Justice: Legal 
Frameworks for Denationalized Governance 
Structures
RSC No. 96/11 
Martin SHAPIRO 
Integrating Scientific Expertise into 
Regulatory Decision-Making.
The Frontiers o f Science Doctrine: American 
Experiences with the Judicial Control o f 
Science-Based Decision-Making
RSC No. 96/12
Gianna BOERO/Giuseppe TULLIO 
Currency Substitution and the Stability of 
the German Demand for Money Function 
Before and After the Fall of the Berlin Wall
RSC No. 96/13
Riccardo MARSELLI/Marco VANNINI 
Estimating the Economic Model of Crime in 
the Presence of Organised Crime: Evidence 
from Italy
RSC No. 96/14 
Paul DE GRAUWE
The Economics of Convergence Towards 
Monetary Union in Europe
RSC No. 96/15
Daniel GROS
A Reconsideration of the Cost of EMU 
The Importance of External Shocks and 
Labour Mobility




























































































Pierre LASCOUMES/Jérôme VALLUY 
Les activités publiques conventionnelles 
(APC): un nouvel instrument de politique 
publique? L’exemple de la protection die 
l’environnement industriel
RSC No. 96/17 
Sharmila REGE
Caste and Gender: The Violence Against 
Women in India
RSC No. 96/18 
Louis CHARPENTIER 





Institutions and Attitudes: Towards an 
Understanding of the Problem of Low 
Turnout in the European Parliament 
Elections of 1994
RSC No. 96/20 
Keith BLACKBURN/Lill HANSEN 
Public Policy and Economic Growth in an 




Pitfalls on the Path to a Single European
Currency
RSC No. 96/22 
Roel M.W.J. BEETSMA/
A. Lans BOVENBERG
Does Monetary Unification Lead to
Excessive Debt Accumulation?
RSC No. 96/23 
Margaret LEVI 
A State of Trust
RSC No. 96/24 
Lorenzo BINI SMAGHI 
How Can the ECB be Credible?
RSC No. 96/25 
Olivier FILLIEULE
Police Records and the National Press in 
France. Issues in the Methodology of Data- 
Collection from Newspapers
RSC No. 96/26 
Peter H. SCHUCK
The Re-evaluation of American Citizenship
RSC No. 96/27 
Peter ROBINSON
The Role and Limits of Active Labour 
Market Policy
RSC No. 96/28 
Sasha BAILLIE
The Seat of the European Institutions: An 
Example of Small State Influence in 
European Decision-making
RSC No. 96/29 
Neil WINN
The Limits of International Organisation 
Leadership? European Crisis Management in 
the 1980s and the Inherent Tension Between 
Bilateralism and Collectivism
RSC No. 96/30 
Paul ORMEROD 
Unemployment: A Distributional 
Phenomenon
RSC No. 96/31 
Marlene WIND
Europe Towards a Post-Hobbesian Order?
A Constructivist Theory of European 
Integration (Or how to explain European 
Integration as an unintended consequence of 
rational state-action)
RSC No. 96/32 
Marlene WIND
Rediscovering Institutions: A Reflectivist 
Critique of Rational Institutionalism
RSC No. 96/33 
Evelyne RTTAINE 
Hypothèses pour le sud de l’Europe: 
territoires et médiations
RSC No. 96/34 
Iver B. NEUMANN 
Russia as Europe’s Other
RSC No. 96/35
Lars LJUNGQVIST/Thomas J. SARGENT 
The European Unemployment Dilemma
RSC No. 96/36 
Maurizio FERRERA 
A New Social Contract?
The Four Social Europes: Between 
Universalisai and Selectivity



























































































RSC No. 96/37 
Serge PAUGAM 
A New Social Contract?




A New Social Contract?
Le traitement de l'intégration et de la 
marginalisation culturelle en France
RSC No. 96/39 
Paul ORMEROD 
A New Social Contract?
Unemployment in Europe
RSC No. 96/40 
Karel VAN DEN BOSCH 
A New Social Contract?




A New Social Contract?




A New Social Contract?
In Defence o f Welfare: Social Protection and 
Social Reform in Eastern Europe
RSC No. 96/43
Martin RHODES 
A New Social Contract?
Globalisation and West European Welfare 
States
RSC No. 96/44 
Fritz SCHARPF 
A New Social Contract?
Negative and Positive Integration in the 




A New Social Contract?
Global and Regional Agencies and the 




A New Social Contract?
The Social Contract and the Problem o f the 
Firm
RSC No. 96/47 
BUI JORDAN 
A New Social Contract?
European Social Citizenship: Why a New 
Social Contract Will (Probably) Not Happen
RSC No. 96/48
Carlos CLOSA 
A New Social Contract?
EU Citizenship as the Institutional Basis o f a 
New Social Contract: Some Sceptical 
Remarks
RSC No. 96/49 
Alexander KREHER 




The New European Agencies
The European Environment Agency and
Prospects fo r a European Network o f
Environmental Administrations
RSC No. 96/51
Rod A. W. RHODES
The New European Agencies
Agencies in British Government: Revolution
or Evolution ?
RSC No. 96/52 
Jonathan GOLUB
Why Did They Sign? Explaining EC 
Environmental Policy Bargaining
RSC No. 96/53 
Thomas CHRISTIANSEN 
Reconstructing European Space: From 
Territorial Politics to MultUevel Governance
RSC No. 96/54 
Elisabeth PAULET
Universal Banks and the European Banking 
System: Prospects and Problems
RSC No. 96/55
Michael J. ARTIS/Wenda ZHANG
Business Cycles, Exchange Rate Regimes
and the ERM: Is there a European Business
Cycle?




























































































Walter MATTU/Anne-Marie SLAUGHTER 
Constructing the European Community 
Legal System from the Ground Up:




Temporal Consistency and Policy 
Credibility: Why Democracies Need 
Non-Majoritarian Institutions
RSC No. 96/58 
Jonathan GOLUB
Modelling Judicial Dialogue in the European 
Community: The Quantitative Basis of 
Preliminary References to the ECJ
RSC No. 96/59
Alec STONE SWEET 
Judicialization and the Construction of 
Governance
RSC No. 96/60 
Ute COLLIER
Deregulation, Subsidiarity and 





The Impact of the Maastricht Fiscal Criteria 
on Employment in Europe
RSC No. 96/62 
Carol HARLOW
“Francovich” and the Problem of the 
Disobedient State
RSC No. 96/63 
Thomas GEHRING 
Environmental Policy in the European 
Union. Governing in Nested Institutions 
and the Case of Packaging Waste
RSC No. 97/1
Donatella della PORTA/Herbert REITER 
The Policing of Mass Demonstration in 
Contemporary Democracies 




The Policing of Mass Demonstration in 
Contemporary Democracies 




The Policing of Mass Demonstration in
Contemporary Democracies
Policing Protest in the United States: From
the 1960s to the 1990s
RSC No. 97/4
Olivier FILLIEULE/Fabien JOBARD 
The Policing of Mass Demonstration in 
Contemporary Democracies 
The Policing o f Protest in France: Towards 
a Model o f Protest Policing
RSC No. 97/5
Dominique WISLER/Hanspeter KRIESI 
The Policing of Mass Demonstration in 
Contemporary Democracies 
Public Order, Protest Cycles and Political 
Process: Two Swiss Cities Compared
RSC No. 97/6 
P.A.J. WADDINGTON 
The Policing of Mass Demonstration in 
Contemporary Democracies 
Controlling Protest in Contemporary, 
Historical and Comparative Perspective
RSC No. 97/7 
Herbert REITER
The Policing of Mass Demonstration in 
Contemporary Democracies 
Police anti Public Order in Italy, 1944-1948. 
The Case o f Florence
RSC No. 97/8
Oscar JAIME-JIMENEZ
The Policing of Mass Demonstration in
Contemporary Democracies
The Policing o f Social Protest in Spain:
From Dictatorship to Democracy
RSC No. 97/9 
Martin WINTER
The Policing of Mass Demonstration in 
Contemporary Democracies 
Police Philosophy and Protest Policing in 
the Federal Republic o f Germany, 1960- 
1990



























































































RSC No. 97/10 
Rocco DE BIASI
The Policing of Mass Demonstration in
Contemporary Democracies
The Policing o f Hooliganism in Italy
RSC No. 97/11
Donatella della PORTA
The Policing of Mass Demonstration in
Contemporary Democracies
Police Knowledge and Public Order:
Some Reflections on the Italian Case
RSC No. 97/12 
Patrick A. McCa r t h y  




Greening the EC Regional and Cohesion
Funds. Explaining Variation Across Similar
Policy Areas
RSC No. 97/14
Richard SINNOTT/Nessa WINSTON 




Double Allegiance in European Integration:
Publics, Nation-States, and Social Policy
RSC No. 97/16
Michael J. ARTIS/Wenda ZHANG 
The Linkage of Interest Rates Within the 
EMU
RSC No. 97/17 
Dimitri G. DEMEKAS/
Zenon G. KONTOLEMIS 
Unemployment in Greece:
A Survey of the Issues
RSC No. 97/18
Olivier FILLIEULE
«Plus 5a change, moins 5a change» -
Demonstrations in France During the
Nineteen-Eighties
RSC No. 97/19 
Tanja A. BORZEL
Policy Networks - A New Paradigm for 
European Governance?
RSC No. 97/20 
Vladimir MIKHALEV 
Poverty Alleviation in the Course of 
Transition: Policy Options for Russia
RSC No. 97/21
Susan SENIOR NELLO
Applying the New Political Economy
Approach to Agricultural Policy Formation
in the European Union
RSC No. 97/22
Repatriation. Legal and Policy Issues 
Concerning Refugees from the Former 
Yugoslavia
Proceedings o f a Roundtable Discussion, 
organised by the Working Group on 
Refugees (RSC)
RSC No. 97/23 
Simon BAGSHAW
Benchmarks or Deutschmarks? Determining 
the Criteria for the Repatriation of Refugees 
to Bosnia and Herzegovina
RSC No. 97/24
Sven BISLEV




Single Cases or a Unique Pair?
The Swiss and Norwegian No to Europe
RSC No. 97/26
D. LESLIE/D. BLACKABY/ S. 
DRINKWATER/P. MURPHY 
Unemployment, Ethnic Minorities and 
Discrimination
RSC No. 97/27 
Bernhard WINKLER
Maastricht Games and Maastricht Contracts
RSC No. 97/28
Horst SIEBERT
Labor Market Rigidities and Unemployment 
in Europe
RSC No. 97/29 
Ute COLLIER
Prospects for a Sustainable Energy Policy in 
the European Union



























































































RSC No. 97/30 
John MYLES/Paul PIERSON 
Friedman’s Revenge: The Reform of 
‘Liberal’ Welfare States in Canada and the 
United States
RSC No. 97/31
Liesbet HOOGHE/Gary MARKS 





Example, Exception or Both? Swiss 
National Identity in Perspective
♦out of print
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
